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Editorial
The Ratio of Observed to Expected:
How Much of It Is Unexpected?
“Numbers don’t lie.” This is probably one of the few univer-
sally accepted truisms we are all brought up with from early
childhood. Increasingly, the practice of medicine is subjected
to applying the “truth in numbers” concept to our practices for
analytical and ratings purposes. But do numbers really always
tell the truth?
A recent example comes to mind to point out the limitations
of this concept. A medical director of another medical system,
whom I am friendly with, called with an acute concern of his.
His spine service, which provides tertiary/quaternary spine
care, had experienced a sudden, very concerning rise in their
mortality (death) rate. This well-established facility prides
itself on their excellent, publicly reported (and even advertised)
health, quality and safety metrics, and he was very concerned
about what seemed to be an extraordinary jump in the mortality
dimension. This prompted him to request an “outsider’s expert
opinion.” Without divulging too many details, I thought my
ensuing observations might be interesting to other spine sur-
geons, as this story demonstrates ongoing concerns for data use
and interpretation and our requirement to transparently prove
the value, quality, and preeminent safety of our work; not only
from one patient to the next, but also in the greater statistical
purview of nonspine surgeons.
In brief, the spine service in question had, over several
years, enjoyed an observed to expected (O/E) mortality ratio
of below or well below 1, meaning that the rate of their deaths
as calculated was of no concern to any reviewers (as it was
below the magic number “1”). This was reassuring to all
administrators and spine care providers alike and they were not
shy in publicizing this number. Usually there would be 1 to 2
deaths over the course of a year assigned to the spine service,
and these were in well-established fashion, carefully analyzed
and processed to look for improvement possibilities.
Without any discernible changes in personnel, policies, or
procedures, suddenly there were 4 recorded deaths in a quar-
ter—and alarm bells were set off as the O/E ratio suddenly
jumped into the “3 s.” After receiving appropriate clearances,
I reviewed the cases in question and found the following
details:
Patient A: An obese, diabetic, male patient in his sixties
had an entirely uneventful lumbar decompression sur-
gery for spinal stenosis and had experienced a cata-
strophic myocardial infarction within a day of the
procedure, despite preoperatively having been cleared
by a cardiologist and being on the appropriate perio-
perative precautionary measures. A case of the
dreaded “silent” diabetic coronary angiopathy had
likely claimed the life of this patient.
Patient B: A male patient in his late fifties presented with
a bilateral unreduced fracture dislocation C4-5 with a
C4 level ASIA A, MS 0 spinal cord injury more than
24 hours out from a motorcycle crash. A staged ante-
rior decompression and reduction with interbody graft-
ing and locking plate fixation was followed a day later
by a multilevel posterior decompression and fusion.
Both surgeries were performed swiftly without com-
plications and resulted in an effective decompression
of the cord and good hardware placement. A week
later the patient had failed to improve neurologically
at all, he was ventilator dependent, and his follow up
MRI showed a nice cord decompression but devastat-
ing intramedullary cord signal changes. After several
visits with the palliative care team, family conferences
with surgeons, rehabilitation medicine doctors, and
with support of his family, he decided to be given
comfort care only. The patient expired peacefully a
day later.
Patient C:Amale patient in his later eighties with a typical
AO type B2 lower cervical spine hyperextension frac-
ture in ankylosing spondylitis without neurologic defi-
cits was treated with early posttraumatic posterior
multilevel fixation with low bloodloss and great-
looking reduction and fixation. This emaciated male
had ongoing postoperative dysphagia without any signs
of esophageal injury or entrapment, and after repeated
failed efforts at nutritional support, was finally sched-
uled for a percutaneous endoscopic gastric (PEG) tube.
A day after this procedure, the patient expired from the
complications of an occult perforated gastric artery.
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Patient D: A female patient in her late seventies with
multiple comorbidities, who had failed prolonged non-
operative care for a midlumbar burst fracture with high
grade canal stenosis and inability to mobilize, had
received an uneventful limited posterior decompres-
sion, fixation and fusion after multiple well-
documented medical and shared decisionmaking
interactions of her spine providers with an agonized
patient and an agonized family. After successful
mobilization she was transferred to a skilled nursing
facility a week later. There she developed clear wound
drainage 2 weeks after her discharge from the hospital.
She was, however, refused return to her primary
hospital by practitioners at her care facility for almost
a full week with the statement that “she wouldn’t
tolerate any more spine surgery anyways.” When she
finally was brought back to the hospital in question,
she presented in septic shock and despite heroic sur-
gery, finally succumbed to multiorgan failure.
These 4 cases and the patient fates that they represent raise a
number of interesting questions and concerns about how we see
and use statistics to look at our practices.
 Aging and sicker patients: Undoubtedly, in many coun-
tries the population that we as spine surgeons are asked
to treat are getting older and sicker. The statistics are
fairly clear in terms of the trends continuing to point in
that direction. Three of the 4 patients in this mortality
statistic clearly were representative of this well-
documented global trend.1
 The attribution of “responsibility” in 3 of these 4 these
cases (patients B, C, and D) raises questions about
whose decision it is to attribute these cases. The patient
with the complication of the PEG tube placement
should have arguably never been assigned to the spine
service, as the patient experienced the complication as
a result of another procedure. However, the spine ser-
vice “ordered” this other procedure, so they should be
still the responsible party. Should the initial surgeon
and their service bear the responsibility for this mor-
tality or should this be placed into the domain of the
subsequent consulting service? Should the clear delay
in care of an outside convalescent facility asked to
care for patient D be held more or less responsible than
the treating surgeon, who did the best they could under
most difficult circumstances and had no knowledge of
a neglected wound healing complication (despite clear
orders asking to be notified in case of wound
drainage)?
 In the case of the patient with severe spinal cord injury
who decided to have life support measures ended,
despite best medical efforts due to a grim preexisting
outlook—is that the responsibility of the treating sur-
geon? Does the attribution of this case to surgeons really
help us as society or could we intimidate future surgeons
into thinking by doing nothing they could stay clear of a
complications listing, thus depriving patients with diffi-
cult conditions from receiving any interventional care?
In the end, it turns out that these assignment decisions
are made by hospital coders who do their best by fol-
lowing guidelines. In their logic and according to their
guidelines, they thought they were doing “the right
thing” but also did not ask for input from the surgeons
in order to stay “independent.” As was the case in this
hospital system, coders are usually not part of the dis-
cussions held behind “closed doors” in morbidity/mor-
tality and quality review proceedings. Thus, they don’t
know what discussions went on among peers and are left
to their own adjudication.
 Calculating “E”: The statistical tool used to try to
express the comorbidities of patients to provide a refer-
ence for the “observed” part of an occurrence is the “E”
as in the “expected” part of the O/E quotient. In princi-
ple, a “quotient” is used to express mathematically the
“presence or degree of a characteristic in someone or
something.”2 In an equation where the desired outcome
is a quotient below “1,” the role of the divisor is obvi-
ously critically important, as it provides the very foun-
dation of this equation; in short, the larger this number is
the better the chance to bring the result towards the
magical “1” or below, the smaller the likelihood it will
be above “1,” a dreaded finding, especially if it is a
change from the treasured past values. The critical ques-
tion, therefore, is how the expected number is calculated.
Basically, the targeted population for the expected
cohort is compared to a “reference” population derived
from a larger database (for instance, in the United States,
this is derived from a Medicare database with fee-for-
service reimbursements) using patient characteristics
such as age range, gender, and some key diagnostic
codes expressed in ICD 9 or 10 terminology. In the case
of the ankylosing spondylitis fracture patient in his eigh-
ties, the statistical modeling apparently predicted a mor-
tality rate of 3%. This was quite surprising as every
publication over the last 20 years reports the 1 year
mortality rate of patients with ankylosing spondylitis
fractures, regardless of type of treatment to be 20% or
even higher, especially in a patient close to 90 years
age.3 In closer review, it appeared that the key para-
meter—the fracture in an ankylosing spine—had been
dropped to a lower representation in the coding hierar-
chy, thus missing the key point of the impact of this
injury entirely. The coder probably felt that the dyspha-
gia was attributable to the surgery and the surgeon, but
did not know that this was an expected problem of the
advanced age and the nature of injury in this type of
underlying spine condition. No doubt this adjudication
would probably be heavily called into question by most,
if not all, spine surgeons. Interestingly, change in coding
personnel may result in different interpretations as well,
as was likely the case here.
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 Small numbers effect: When relatively small numbers
are assessed statistically then any shift in numbers can
have a dramatic effect. In this example, a move from 1 to
4 patient deaths may look like a dramatic rise from one
quarter to the next, but seen over the course of a year or
longer should balance out.
 Cost of care: Patients A and B seemed to have excellent
care, not only during their hospitalization but also in
their preoperative workup. In their attribution of cause,
the question was raised why patient A did not have a
more detailed coronary artery workup after having com-
pleted had an unremarkable preoperative ECG and a
stress test, and reporting no clinical signs of cardiac
insufficiency. In patient B’s case, the thought was that
the patient could have been kept in a surgical unit for a
longer period of time to monitor healing better. Again,
this is an example of a discrepancy of what most, if not
all, spine surgeons would consider an acceptable and
widely practiced standard of care and an abstract image
usually derived posthoc of an idealized form of care,
which is frequently not only unrealistic, but quite possi-
bly more dangerous to patients.
In the end I assured the medical director that no intervention
was needed. Reassuringly, other typical quality parameters,
like infection, unplanned readmissions, and returns to the OR
were completely unchanged. My advice was to enhance com-
munications of coders, quality managers, and clinicians to
record best possible “cleaned” data so that real insights to
benefit patient care can be gleaned without data manipulation
and “gaming the system.” In this case an amicable resolution of
the coders and the clinicians was possible, but it was not hard to
see how different this could have been played out had there
been differences between administrators and clinicians. In a
situation of disjointed clinicians and administrators it is very
possible, and indeed has happened, that “hard data” can have
easily been weaponized against clinicians. In the end, this
example shows how difficult it can be to apply the hard binary
truth of simple numbers to complex clinical scenarios with
many human factors attached. We have to realize that there
are judgment calls made, not only by clinicians in the hospitals,
but also by coders as to the classifications and ratings of care
and complications. In the act of translation of words into num-
bers, judgment calls in grey zone situations affect the numeric
expression and lead to false impressions. So in the end, num-
bers don’t lie—of course—but we humans can err in our inter-
pretations of numbers.
For me, the main message is that clinicians in high-
complexity specialties like spine surgery must not only docu-
ment their decisionmaking and clinical actions diligently and
clearly, but ideally are also involved from ground up in the data
gathering and analysis process and cannot abdicate this respon-
sibility to some detached coding office. Otherwise, the
expected quality data can lead to most unexpected findings,
with extraneous, and potentially harmful, conclusions being
drawn.
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